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WHEN TALK ISN'T CHEAP:
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF COMMUNICATION WITH
PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS FOR CLASS ACTION
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN A POST-FINANCIAL
RECESSION WORLD
ELIZABETH M. WILLIAMSON
"Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to
compromise whenever you can. As a peacemaker the
lawyer has superior opportunity of being a good man.
There will still be business enough." - Abraham Lincoln.
I. INTRODUCTION
Desperate times call for desperate measures. Out of the 210 federal
securities class actions filed in 2008, 103 of the defendants were financial
companies and 91 of the filings stemmed from the subprime/liquidity
crisis.' The onset of a crisis is often the catalyst to changes within the
government and business community. "The recent surge in new securities
litigation is event-driven, the result of the subprime crisis." 2 The movement
towards fairness is always the goal of the law, but for defense counsel
searching for a way to reduce litigation costs and increase a favorable
judgment for their client- these efforts have not gone far enough to decrease
the one-sided costs incurred during the pre-certification stage of class action
litigation. At the pre-certification stage, defense counsel faces
infringements upon their fundamental right to free speech under the First
Amendment and expansive restrictions on speech set by district. One of the
attempts to reign in the costs of class action litigation was the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, which helped move more class action cases from
state to federal courts.3 This article will discuss the efforts of the courts and
the federal government through the Class Action Fairness Act and state
courts erroneously applying the Gulf Oil v. Bernard standard set by the
Supreme Court.
Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2011.
'STANDFORD LAW SCHOOL, CLASS ACTION SECURITIES LITIGATION 2008: A YEAR
IN REVIEW, http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouseresearch.html (last visited
Jan. 10, 2010).
2 id.
3 CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005, S. REP. No. 109-14 (2005).
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Defense counsel wishing to reach a settlement or defeat class
certification will often encounter the question of whether it is economically
and legally beneficial to communicate with class members before
certification. The costs of communication incurred by defense counsel are
unique to their position in class action litigation because absent plaintiff
class members are not subject to other burdens imposed upon defendants.
They need not hire counsel or appear. They are almost never subject to
counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability for fees or costs. Absent class
members have "no real duties to the parties or the court.'A They are also not
subject to coercive or punitive remedies. Nor will an adverse judgment
typically bind an absent plaintiff for any damages, although a valid adverse
judgment may extinguish any of the plaintiffs claims litigated at trial.6
Defendants also face the added burden of combating powerful plaintiff
attorneys and face "judicial blackmail" when they are sued in jurisdictions
that are considered plaintiff- friendly.7 Such leverage can essentially force
corporate defendants to pay ransom to a class attorney by settling-rather
than litigating-frivolous lawsuits.8 Lawsuits with little to no merit are
easily brought to fruition because they can be prosecuted inexpensively.9
Defendants may want to communicate to conduct an aggressive discovery
effort even if the result will only provide a "modest chance of defeating
certification."' 0 In that process, defense counsel may find information that
will disarm the entire class or even the class representative." Interests that
must be balanced include the interest of the class members to be protected
from harmful information and the positions of the parties involved in the
litigation.12
The first section of this analysis will discuss the current legal
framework for how defense counsel should approach pre-certification
communication. The second section will discuss the current legal
scholarship on communication with putative class members and the
economic costs and benefits of pursuing communication with putative class
members.
4 Craig M. Freeman, Knowledge is Power: A Practical Proposal to Protect
Putative Class Members from Improper Pre-Certification Communication, 2006
FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, 4 (2006) (discussion of the need to improve judicial oversight
of communication with putative class members).
5 Id.
6 Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985).
7 Id.
8 S. REP. NO. 109-014, at 20 (2005).
9 Douglas R. Richmond, Class Actions and Ex Parte Communications: Can We
Talk?, 68 Mo. L. REv. 810, 814 (2003).
10 Susan Getzendanner, Class Certification Discovery, 15 LrIG. 25, 25 (1989).
" Id.
12 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 206 F.
Supp. 2d 559, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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II. To COMMUNICATE OR NOT TO COMMUNICATE? THAT IS THE
QUESTION
The law governing the right to communicate with putative class
action members begins at the free speech clause of the Constitution. 3 Its
foundation is also composed of statutory regulation by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and case law, with the corner stone of judicial
interpretation the Supreme Court's decision in Gulf Oil Co.14 The First
Amendment states "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press."s The guarantee of freedom of expression is not without limits, but it
is a fundamental right every United States citizen and private organization
may exercise. Limitations on the exercise of free speech are lawful and in
the case of lawyers, commercial speech aimed at contacting and soliciting
clients is lawfully limited by the court system.'6 This is in compliance with
the Supreme Court's view that "although commercial speech is protected by
the First Amendment, not all regulation of such speech is
unconstitutional."' 7 Laws created that unduly burden this right are
vehemently opposed by the Supreme Court- in the context of class action
litigation, any court restrictions on communication between plaintiff
'3 Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
14 Id. Putative or absent class member - both terms will be used interchangeably
throughout this note. Putative as defined by Black's Law Dictionary, meaning
"reputed, believed supposed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1272 (8th ed. 1999).
's U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
16 See generally Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) ("It is
well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under
all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
constitutional problem.").
'7 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002). The test for
commercial speech is whether it concerns:
[U]nlawful activity or is misleading. If so, then the speech is not
protected by the First Amendment. If the speech concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading, however, we next ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If it is, then we
determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and, finally, whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Each of
these latter three inquiries must be answered in the affirmative
for the regulation to be found constitutional.
Id
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counsel, defense counsel and potential class members must comply with the
freedom of speech.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class action lawsuits,
allowing one or more members of a class to sue or be sued as
representatives if the class meets the Rule's requirements.' 8  Classes
seeking certification must 1) numerous, 2) with questions of law or fact
common to the class, 3) claims or defenses are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class and 4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.1 9 Once the class meets the
requirements set by 23(a), it must also go through certification orders set by
the judge governing the class action.20 Judges may have to "probe behind
the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question." 2' Judges
are still free to determine whether or not during the course of litigation, the
class certification needs to be changed or modified.22 Class action litigants
must keep in mind that the right to commence a class action proceeding is
"a procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.
Should these substantive claims become moot in the Article III sense, by
settlement of all personal claims for example, the court retains no
jurisdiction over the controversy of the individual plaintiffs." 23 Absent class
members are "not required to do anything. [They] may sit back and allow
litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are safeguards
provided for [their] protection."2 4 Even if an unfavorable judgment is
rendered against the class in a class action, putative class members do not
have to succumb to coercive remedies.25
Fed. Civ. Pro. Rule 23(d) allows the court to control
communication between plaintiffs and defendants' counsel and potential
class members in class action litigation.2 6 Rule 23 authorizes courts to
"regulate communications with potential class members, even before
certification." 2 7 The right of the court to control communications between
the respective parties' counsel and potential class members is limited by the
First Amendment and a clear record of possible need to limit speech and
potential interference with the rights of each party.28 The standard set by the
Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Co. allows the district court to determine
'
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
1 Id.
20 d
21 Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
22 id
23 Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980).
24 Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985).
25 id
26 MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FouRTH) § 21.12 (2004).
27 id.
28 id
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whether communication engaged in by counsel for both parties is
appropriate on an individual case basis. 29 When a relationship is inherently
coercive, there still must be a clear showing of abuse but the court may
decline to find a specific instance of abuse.30
Although the court has the ultimate power to control
communication between parties, it is an ambiguous power. Communication
boundaries between parties and unnamed class members are undefined
because of the court's power to restrain and expand communication on a
case-by-case basis.3 ' One of the legal costs consists of whether defense
counsel will be subject to court sanctions if communication with putative
class members falls within discovery- if so, the defendant must provide a
strong reason as to why absent class members should be compelled to
respond to discovery.32
Besides the power to limit communication given by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Gulf Oil Co., the court can on its own act to
restrict communications between the defendants and class members. * The
purpose of court ordered communication restrictions must relate to insuring
the best interests of class members are protected. 34 "The Court must balance
the interest of the parties in presenting their respective positions and the
interest of class members in being free from inappropriate influences."
Courts especially feel the need to closely monitor class actions between
employees and defendant employers because "the danger of such coercion
between employers and employees [is] sufficient to warrant the imposition
of restrictions regarding communication between defendants and potential
class members." 36 Restrictions also reach to the core of Federal Rule of
29 Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981).
30 Ralph Oldsmobile, Inc., v. Gen. Motors Corp., 99 Civ. 4567(AGS), 2001 WL
1035132, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001). The court reversed the district court's
orders to restrict communication. In its decision, the court found that it was not
easy to interfere between the business relationships of the defendant and putative
class members. Courts cannot simply interpose themselves in the business
relationship between a franchisor and its franchisees each time a franchisee files a
putative class action against the franchisor. Notifying the dealers in this action, and
their ability to communicate with counsel and participate in the action, should,
however, provide a reasonable measure of protection. Id. at *6.
31 See generally Gulf Oil Co., 452 U.S. at 89.
32 Enter. Wall Paper Mfg. Co. v. Bodman, 85 F.R.D. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
33 Cobell v. Norton, 225 F.R.D. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2004).
34 d
3 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 206 F.
Supp. 2d 559, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).36 Id.
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Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)(D), requiring that certified classes also meet the
manageability requirement- "addressing the whole range of practical
problems that may render the class action format inappropriate for a
particular suit."3 7 With reference to this litigation, the Court of Appeals
noted that the difficulties of distributing any ultimate recovery to the class
members would be formidable, though not necessarily insuperable, and
commented that it was "reluctant to permit actions to proceed where they
are not likely to benefit anyone but the lawyers who bring them."38 The
23(d) provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also states that the
court can impose "conditions on the representative parties or on
interveners."09
A. Supreme Court's Gulf Oil Communication Rule
The Supreme Court in Gulf Oil ruled that communication between
putative class members and counsel cannot be restricted unless the district
court has a reason to do so. 4 0 In Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, the Supreme Court
answered the question of whether it is constitutionally permissible to limit
communication between possible class action members and parties.4' The
Supreme Court held that "because of the potential for abuse, a district court
has both the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a class
action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and
parties."42 In Gulf Oil Co., the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant
alleging racial discrimination in the workplace.43 The defendant sent
potential class members settlement offers in exchange for a release form
waiving any claims they may have for racial discrimination against the
company." The defendant filed a motion to restrict communications
between the putative class members and counsel for both parties.45 The
court dismissed the defendant's motion because "an order limiting
communications between parties and potential class members should be
based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the
need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the
parties."4 The Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, instructs the
district court to provide a clear record, which would "ensure that the court
is furthering, rather than hindering, the policies embodied in the Federal
37 id
38 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164 (1974).
39 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
40 Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981).
41 id.
42 Id. at 100.
43 Id. at 92.
" Id. at 91.
45 Id. at 92.
4 Id. at 101.
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Rules of Civil Procedure, especially 23."" The Supreme Court also noted
that there are serious issues revolving around restraints on expression
involved in judicial orders restraining communication.4 8 In addition, "such a
weighing - identifying the potential abuses being addressed - should result
in a carefully drawn order that limits speech as little as possible, consistent
with the rights of the parties under the circumstances."49 The Court
declined to analyze the First Amendment issues in restrictions of
communication- only in cases where there is a "fully developed case load"
will the court decide to deal with the issue.so
Gulf Oil Co. stands for the proposition that action by the court
should only commence upon a finding that the defendant has actually
engaged in harmful communication with putative class members, not in the
fear that such communication will occur.51 The court "may not exercise the
power without a specific record showing by the moving party of the
particular abuses by which it is threatened. Moreover, the district court
must find that the showing provides a satisfactory basis for relief and that
the relief sought would be consistent with the policies of Rule 23."52 If the
district court finds sufficient evidence to impose a communication
restriction upon a party, they must be certain that "the relief sought would
be consistent with the policies of Rule 23 giving explicit consideration to
the narrowest possible relief which would protect the respective parties."5 3
By weighing different factors and the evidence provided by the party
requesting the communication restriction, the district court will provide a
record for appellate review in case the restricted party requests an appeal.5 4
The district court's failure to review evidence before restricting
communication by the parties is an abuse of discretion.
It has almost been twenty years since the Court handed down its
decision in Gulf Oil Co., and federal courts have all interpreted its decision
with different results on a circuit-by-circuit basis. The Supreme Court has
provided little guidance since its decision. It may be due to the fact that
because of their proximity to the litigation, trial judges have gained the
wisdom necessary to know when to begin involvement in the
4 7 Id. at 101-02.
4 8 Id. at 104.
49 id.
s0 Id. at 101 n.12.
' Id.
52 Id. at 102.
53 id.
54 Id. at 103.
5 5id.
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communication of parties involved in class action before class
certification.56 The Supreme Court in Hoffnan-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling
observed that the almost boundless authority of the trial court to man its
own affairs is "well settled, as courts traditionally have exercised
considerable authority 'to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."' 57 The only semblance of
restraint provided by the Supreme Court is a reminder that courts must not
compromise their commitment to judicial neutrality in its decision to
control the communication process and avoid any semblance of judicial
58
endorsement of any action taken by any party during litigation.
Erosion of the Gulf Oil Co. standard allows movants who wish to
limit defense counsel communication to merely show that there could be
some harmful communication rather than meet the burden of proof showing
that harmful communication has occurred.59 This can be used as a litigation
tool for plaintiffs to obtain information about the defense counsel's plans to
resolve litigation, whether it is through settlement or trial.60 Part of the
litigation process is to allow both sides to present their best case, and
unjustifiable increases of court control over party communication will deter
defense counsel from taking communication strategies that may be in the
best interest of their client in fear of court communication restrictions or in
a worst case scenario, court sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.6 ' The outlook worsens for defense counsel when
a district court who does not have jurisdiction over a case, exercises
jurisdiction, and when jurisdiction is challenged, it leaves defendants open
to more lawsuits in different states and countries with different decisions
attached to them.62 This is in direct contradiction to the rule requiring a
"judgment issued without proper personal jurisdiction over an absent party
is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere and thus has no res judicata
effect as to that party."63
B. Courts Have Their Own Approach to Pre-Certification
Communication
The vague standard set by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Co. has
allowed each circuit court to determine whether or not defense counsel has
engaged in improper communication with class members on an individual
56 Hoffinann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 171 (1989).
5 Id. at 172-73 (internal citations omitted).
18 Id. at 174.
SId.
60 id
61 Id.
62 Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 800 (1985).
Id. at 805.
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case basis. State courts have found that "for the purposes of defense
communication with 216(b) prospective plaintiffs [state of Florida case
law] the situation is analogous to a pre-certification Rule 23 class action,
when the prospective plaintiffs are still unrepresented parties."6" Appellate
courts have reversed court-ordered communication restrictions where a lack
of evidence shows possible abuse by the restricted party. If defense counsel
appeals the decision of the district court on whether the pre-certification
communication was proper, they should tailor their argument to each circuit
court. The Eighth Circuit has adopted the Gulf Oil Co. rule controlling
communication with putative class members.65 In Great Rivers Cooperative
v. Farmland Industries, Inc., the district court granted plaintiffs' request to
restrict defendant's communications with putative class members.66
Plaintiffs filed suit against Great Rivers Cooperative alleging the
cooperative had violated RICO, federal securities laws, and state laws when
they failed to redeem equity.67 The cooperative published a two-page
opinion letter and sent it to members of the cooperative, denouncing all of
the charges.6 8 The district court granted the plaintiffs motion to restrict
communication between the defendant and cooperative members because
the publication contained misleading information.69 The Eighth Circuit
overturned the district court's decision because "the district court made
insufficient findings regarding misrepresentation and the likelihood of
serious abuses.7 0 That a statement "appears' in certain respects to be
"somewhat misleading" is not sufficient to require a party to print a rebuttal
without serious and careful weighing of that party's First Amendment
rights."7 There must be "a clear record of and specific findings that reflect
a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with
the rights of the parties." 7 2 "The effect of a defendant attempting to
influence potential plaintiffs not to join a potential class action is just as
damaging to the purposes of Rule 23 as a defendant that influences
members of an already certified class to opt out.... In both scenarios,
6 2-22 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP. CLASS ACTIONs 26 (2003).
65 See generally Great Rivers Coop. v. Farmland Indus. Inc., 59 F.3d 764 (8th Cir.
1995).
66 d 1.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 2.
69 id
70id
) Id.72Id. at 3.
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improper communication could diminish the size of the class or potential
class, and thus, reduce the potential liability."73
A case where the court declined to find any misconduct by the
defendant's communication to the putative class members involved
distribution of a settlement agreement by the defendant's agents. In
Bradford v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., Union Pacific sent putative class
members a form letter about their claims, asking the claimant to confirm
that he initiated contact with Union Pacific about their claim, if he was
represented by an attorney, and informed plaintiff that he had a right to an
attorney.74 "Union Pacific took the initiative to inform the Court of
unrepresented claimants contacting it about settling their claims and to seek
the Court's guidance. Since that time, Union Pacific has taken steps to
ensure that claimants who contact it know that this class action is pending
and that they may consult with an attorney about their claim."75 Bradford
can be differentiated from the Great Rivers Cooperative decision because
the evidence of harmful communication was not present in the Bradford
case. The unnamed class members in Bradford were only a small number of
claimants (eight) and also the communication clearly informed the
unnamed class members that they were entitled to a lawyer.76 Once the
class action case was filed, the company shut down the claims office and
took the initiative to inform claimants of their legal rights as unnamed class
members.n
Defendants in Bublitz v. E.I DuPont de Nemours Co. wanted to
provide a retention proposal directly to members of the putative class as
well as other related communications. Defendants filed a motion to allow
the communications, but maintained that the motion was not necessary.
The judge granted the defendant's motion, and the plaintiff moved to set
aside the Magistrate decision.80 The Eighth Circuit held that there was
"insufficient evidence to justify the limitations on the Defendant's
communications.',8 ' The court found the defendant's relationship with the
putative class members as employer-employee to be a significant aspect of
whether or not the at-will employer-employee relationship could allow the
7 Keystone Tobacco Co., Inc. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 238 F. Supp. 2d 151, 154-55
(D.D.C. 2002).
74 Bradford v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 05CV4075, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37910, at
*34 (W.D. Ark. 2006).
7s Id at *4.
76 Id.
n Id.
78 Bublitz v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 196 F.R.D. 545, 546 (S.D. Iowa 2000).
79 id.
81 Id.
s1 Id. at 547.
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defendant undue influence and coercion.82 This court incorrectly concluded
that the mere possibility of coercion by the defendant justified "minimal"
protection of putative class members by the court.83 The "defendant-
employer has the right to communicate settlement offers directly to putative
class-member employees."" The defendant was required to provide a copy
of the communication in writing to class members along with the names of
the persons it was sent to, to the Court and to Plaintiff's counsel and give
the putative class member ten days to respond.85 The decision in Bublitz
primarily hinged upon the defendant providing inaccurate information to
putative class members, which changed the course of the class-action
litigation. The course of action the Eighth Circuit will take to respond to
restrict specific communications between unnamed class members and
defense counsel is unclear. It is unclear because the answer is dependent
upon the nature of the communication proposed by the defendant.
From the decisions cited above, one can surmise that the court's
primary concern is to protect unnamed class members for misleading
information that may change the course of the pre-certification hearing.
Defense counsel should refrain from distributing information that the court
may find misleading.86 If defense counsel acts cautiously to be sure the
information distributed is not misleading or patently false, then it is highly
likely that the court will not restrict communication, and the defense
counsel will not violate professional rules of conduct governing
communication between attorneys and unrepresented individuals. Courts
have held defendants liable for distributing false information to class
members by court precedent, such as the Bublitz case, and also under the
state's Professional Rules of Conduct. Violations of the Professional Rules
of Conduct are an important concern for defense counsel to take into
account because of the unclear nature of whether or not unnamed class
members are truly unrepresented by counsel.8 7
In Kleiner v. First National Bank, the decision to limit
communication did not require "particularized findings of abusive conduct
when a given form of speech is inherently conducive to overreaching and
duress."8 The Fifth Circuit has interpreted Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d) to vest
82 Id.
83 id.
84 Id. at 548.8 Id. at 549.
86 d
87 Id.
88 Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1206 (11th Cir. 1985).
The court, in its restriction of communication between defendants and putative
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power in the district court to "enlist the aid of a defendant in identifying
class members to whom notice must be sent." 89 Not only are defendants
saddled with the task of preparing for litigation in the Fifth Circuit, they are
also required to spend limited funds and time assisting the plaintiff in
identifying absent class members. 90 This is in contradiction to the Supreme
Court's rule that in the case of class action litigation, "the representative
plaintiff should perform the tasks, for it is he who seeks to maintain the suit
as a class action and to represent other members of his class." In Eisen IV
we noted the general principle that a party must bear the 'burden of
financing his own suit'.91 Compiling records and submitting them if they
are relevant to the plaintiff's case is certainly within the rights given by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, which allows parties to obtain information of the "name
and number of each individual likely to have discoverable information." 92
The Supreme Court in Oppenheimer found that the order for the defendants
93to compile these records constituted a breach of discretion. There was a
breach of discretion because "courts must not stray too far from the
principle underlying Eisen IV that the representative plaintiff should bear all
costs relating to the sendinf of notice because it is he who seeks to maintain
the suit as a class action."9 The Court feared that allowing the district court
to shift costs for the sake of their own convenience in spite of court
precedent requiring plaintiffs to find their own class members would allow
courts to make decisions based on their own convenience at the injustice of
the defendant.95 Deciding otherwise would "discourage [defense counsel]
from advancing arguments entirely appropriate to the protection of his
rights or the rights of absent class members."96 Absent members are not
under such constraint, especially in light of the fact that the law is unsettled
as to "whether an absent class member may appeal the denial of a class
action when the named plaintiff has been denied appeal because his or her
claim is sufficient to warrant individual prosecution has not been definitely
answered."97
District courts, following the decision in Kleiner, have developed a
class members found that the intent of the defendant was an important
consideration, especially in light of the fact that the communication practices
complained of "was to solicit as many exclusions as possible before the court was
alerted to the operation." It was not for the purpose of "alleviating customer
confusion" as claimed by the defendants. Id. at 1201.
89 Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 348 (1978).90Id
9'Id. at 356.
9 2 FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
9 Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 356.
94 Id. at 359.
95 Id. at 360.
96 Nd
97 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7.45 (4th ed. 2009).
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four-part test to determine whether the defense counsel communication
with putative class members is improper. "In determining the existence of
good cause, four criteria must be considered: 1) the severity and likelihood
of perceived harm; 2) the precision with which the order is draw; 3) the
availability of a less onerous alternative; and 4) the duration of the order."9 8
Statements issued by the defense counsel urging opt-out of the class "by
their very nature, are likely to produce distorted statements on the one hand
and the coercion of individuals on the other."99 Both the decisions in
Kleiner and Wang had the common thread that the communication involved
extreme acts of reckless conduct on the part of the defendants."' 0 In In Re
Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, the district court determined
that any communication with putative class members for the purpose of
changing the course of a pending court action is improper unless there is
expressed authorization given by the court.o' The controversy at hand in
this case was a claim by plaintiffs counsel that the currency interest
charges in a credit card agreement were excessive and charged regardless of
whether a cardholder has or has not exchanged any foreign currency- in
violation of the Truth in Lending Act, Sherman Act, and South Dakota
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.102 The rationale behind their decision is that
they interpreted Gulf Oil Co. to only apply to plaintiffs counsel
communication with putative class members. Adhering to a strict
interpretation of the Gulf Oil Co. decision, the district court in In Re
Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation unduly infringed upon the
defendant's first amendment right to communicate with putative class
members. 03 To further justify the restriction, the court states that even if
the defendant were to argue that his First Amendment rights were unjustly
compromised by the court restriction, the speech at hand was commercial
speech, therefore it is given less protection under the First Amendment
98 Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 485, 490 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
99 Id
1oo See generally Wang, 236 F.R.D. at 485; Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1193. Defendants
in the Wang case posted a notice in the work room near opt-out notices urging that
the employees "Don't Tear the Company Apart! Don't Act Against Each Other!"
Managers also held meetings notifying employees that any action against the
company would "cost the employees money and kill the newspaper." In Kleiner,
the defendant assigned employees to a calling list to contact bank customers and
persuade them to opt out of the class. Employees were "handed computer lists of
customers marked 'friend' or 'foe' as well as score sheets lined with columns for
tallying opt-out commitments and the dollar amounts of the corresponding loans.
1o' In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 361 F. Supp. 2d 237, 253
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
102 id.
los Id. at 253.
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under the court's jurisprudence on freedom of commercial speech cases.04
In Re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation is a prime example of
how the Gulf Oil Co. vague precedent has taken a life of its own. If the
court had taken the Gulf Oil Co. decision as a whole, it would have noticed
that the language throughout the decision addresses both the plaintiff's
counsel (the communication that was unduly restricted) and parties in
general. 0 5 An example of reasonable court limitations on communication
recognizes the defendant's need to communicate with putative class
members with instructions to ensure that the putative class members are
duly informed about their legal rights.'06 In EEOC v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.,
an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission case on gender
discrimination, the court instructed Morgan Stanley to notify anyone it
wishes to communicate with of the following:
Employees must be told that there is a pending lawsuit that
they may join, and that it is unlawful for Morgan Stanley to
retaliate against them if they do. In addition to informing
employees of the right to non-retaliation, the notice must
also provide a short summary of the claims in the EEOC
lawsuit so that employees can make an informed decision
concerning their interest in the case.107
The safeguards set by the court in this case are unambiguous; they protect
the interests of the putative class members and allow defense counsel to
gain information from the putative class members to help build its own
case. os
The American Bar Association standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility released a formal opinion stating that contact
10 Id. The nature of the improper communication between putative class members
and defense counsel in this case was a request by the defendant for putative class
members to adhere to the arbitration clause agreed to by every Citibank cardholder.
1os An example of the case moving from general to specific terms, the Court in Gulf
Oil Co. stated that the district court must determine "[b]ecause of these potential
problems, an order limiting communications between parties and potential class
members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a
weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights
of the parties." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981).
106 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 206 F.
Supp. 2d 559, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
107 id.
108 Id. Behind the court's rationale was the fact that both plaintiff and defense
counsel's case turned upon statistical data. "As such, the proof will mirror that in a
class action, that is, as showing that there is a gross disparity in compensation and
promotion of women who hold the positions of Associate, Vice-President,
Principal and Managing Director in Morgan Stanley's Institutional Equity Division
compared to their male counterparts." Id at 563.
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with putative class members is permissible as long as it complies with
Model Rule 4.3. Rule 4.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
prohibits an attorney from implying they are disinterested in dealing with a
person who is not represented by counsel on behalf of a client.1 09 An
attorney may not give legal advice to the "unrepresented person, other than
the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility
of being in conflict with the interests of the client."'"0 ABA opinion 07-445
takes the stance that there is no attorney-client relationship with putative
class members until the class certification."' As for defense counsel, the
ABA opinion takes the position that defense counsel communications
cannot be limited for the sake of theoretical potential for abuse because the
communication between putative class members and defense counsel is
'vital to efficient and fair class litigation."ll 2 Lawyers are also prohibited
from making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person in
the course of representing a client pursuant to Rule 4.1 of the Model Code
of Professional Conduct." 3
To reign in the costs of class action litigation, especially for
defendants, Congress has taken a variety of steps to move cases from state
courts into the federal court system. The Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA) of 2005 is the latest move in federal intervention on the behalf of
defendants facing the rising costs of class action litigation.
III. MOVEMENTS FOR REFORM: ACADEMIC AND FEDERAL
ARGUMENTS
Defendants need to have access to a variety of strategies that will
result in a favorable resolution for their clients. They may "decide not to
oppose class certification. Maximum res judicata effects may be obtained if
a class is certified. The defendant may not want to spend the time and
money necessary to oppose class certification or may wish to allocate its
resources to the merits trial instead."ll 4 Defendants are not barred by case
law from opposing class certification, "in addition to raising a multiplicity
of arguments in opposition to a class action, together with supporting
affidavits, defendants have often sought deposition and interrogatory
0 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (1983).
110 Id.
11 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-445 (2007).
112 id.
113 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (1983).
14 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONs 7:3 (2009).
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discovery of the named plaintiffs with respect to class issues."" The Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA) was written to respond to the urge for
Congress to reign-in the costs of class action lawsuits incurred through
adhering to the variety of rules in state courts governing class action
lawsuits."' 6  The Committee on the Judiciary conducted hearings on class
action litigation that revealed that, "federal class action filings over the past
ten years have increased by more than 300 percent. At the same time, class
action filings in state courts have grown more than three times faster--by
more than 1000 percent."'"7 Its purpose was to "restore the intent of the
framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court
consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity
jurisdiction."" 8
The note attached to 28 U.S.C. § 1711 states that the purpose of
CAFA is to address abuses of "keeping cases of national importance out of
Federal court" and state and local courts "acting in ways that demonstrate
bias against out-of-State defendants."'19 CAFA's purpose is also to "restore
the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by providing for
Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction; and benefit society by encouraging innovation and
lowering consumer prices."l20 The assumption CAFA makes in section
(b)(2) is that moving more class action cases from state to federal courts
will lower the costs of litigation and induce companies to cut litigation costs
normally passed on to consumers in the price of goods.
CAFA has moved many of the class action cases that would be
tried in the state courts into federal jurisdiction, allowing defense counsel
an easier method of planning for class action cases. Issues encountered for
professional conduct in state courts are less of a concern for defense
counsel now that CAFA moves many cases that would be tried in state
courts in federal court. Plaintiffs, before the creation of CAFA, had the
ability to forum shop throughout the United States and bring their cause of
action to a state that may provide the most favorable outcome.
Opponents of the bill argue that increasing cases in federal courts
will, "[create] an incentive for violators to break the laws of multiple states,
as any collective action to hold them accountable will likely be
dismissed."'21 Supporters of CAFA perceive that it will "result in fewer
15 id.
116 See generally S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005).
" Id. at 14.
1 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. 1171 (2006)).
" Id.
120 d.
121 S. REP. No. 109-14, at 81.
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certified classes. This result would mean fewer settlements and verdicts in
plaintiffs' favor, which in turn would limit the regulatory reach of the sorts
of state laws often enforced by way of class actions."l2 2 CAFA also strikes
at the heart of plaintiff lawyers' strategy of selecting remote areas known as
called 'magnet' jurisdictions in particular counties in Illinois, Texas,
Alabama, and Mississippi. These areas were beholden to local lawyers, had
spun out of control, and would certify meritless classes to coerce
extortionate settlements. The odd frequency with which multi-state class
actions found their way to certain isolated counties suggested that there
may be something to the magnet jurisdiction claim."' 23 If "a state judge is
prejudiced in favor of the plaintiff, it is likely because the defendant is a
corporation, not because the defendant has its headquarters or principal
place of business in another state."l 24 Federalization of class actions also
promotes uniformity in decisions and helps create a national body of
regulatory standards.125 Creating a body of regulatory standards helps
prevent abuses during litigation such as undue restrictions on defendant
communication with putative class members, invariably helping resolve
conflicts that have a huge impact on the economy.126
Powerful plaintiff firms have led to other reforms such as the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 2 7 PLSRA,
unfortunately, did not deter excessive shareholder lawsuits filed by class
representatives; in fact, it only strengthened plaintiffs' law firms that had
the resources to bring them to fruition.128 Plaintiff lawyers in securities
litigation are legally allowed to share court-awarded fees with clients who
serve as representative plaintiffs.12 9 "Nor does federal law require that
plaintiffs' counsel make any certifications to the court regarding its
relationship, financial or other, with the investors named as plaintiffs."o
The PSLRA's reforms limit the number of times that
shareholders may serve as lead plaintiffs and restrict
judicial awards compensating and rewarding representative
parties. Congress also mandated that plaintiffs accompany
122 David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism
Implications ofDiversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1247, 1252 (2007).
13 Id. at 1293.
14 Id. at 1295.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1296.
127 Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J. CoRP. L. 153, 155 (2008).
128 Id. at 156.
129 Id. at 159.
130 Id.
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their complaints with sworn certifications disclosing,
among other information, their involvement in certain prior
lawsuits and forswearing acceptance of future payments
beyond amounts authorized by the statute.... According to
prosecutors, Milberg Weiss caused the paid plaintiffs to
breach their fiduciary duties by inducing them to serve as
class representatives in exchange for a share of Milberg
Weiss's attorneys' fees. The fee sharing arrangements
allegedly created conflicts of interest for the paid plaintiffs,
causing them to favor themselves over the absent class
members and engendering in them 'a greater interest in
maximizing the amount of attorneys' fees awarded to
Milberg Weiss than in maximizing the net recovery to
absent class members' and shareholders. 131
A. First Amendment Rights of the Defendant are Unduly Burdened
by Calls for Increased Pre-Certification Communication
Lincoln aptly observed that the goal of the justice system is not to
breed litigation, but to resolve conflict whether it is through settlement or
through trial. 13 2  Resolution of conflict requires both the plaintiff and
defendant be able to engage in communication with each other. Does
creating stronger safeguards truly protect putative class members and the
class action lawsuit? The defense counsel has an interest in resolving the
case in his/her client's favor. Defense counsel's interest in resolution is not
always contrary to the interests of the class. In cases where defendants have
attempted to coerce putative class members, the courts and plaintiffs
counsel have been able to remedy the problem with disciplinary
sanctions.' Deliberate attempts to circumvent the supervisory role of the
court are already punishable by disciplinary codes and have a remedy
available via motion by the plaintiff or on the court's own accord to hold
defense counsel in contempt of court.134 Remedies available to the court
when damaging communication conducted by the defense counsel are a
strong medicine and can include nullification of any opt-out certificates,
sanctions, and even settlements that have already occurred to be considered
as an advance for a non-existent favorable judgment for the defendants
must recover after a victory at trial.135
Defense counsel is already subject to adherence to Model Code of
Professional Conduct regulations, imposing a commitment to not engage in
132 Lincoln, supra note 2, at 1.
1 Bulblitz v. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 196 F.R.D. 545 (S.D. Iowa 2000).
13 In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D. 370, 377 (W.D. Missouri 1983).
"3 Id. at 378.
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misconduct. Both plaintiff and defense counsel are under constraints
placed by both professional rules of conduct and the possibility of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 sanctions.1 6 In cases where defendants
have attempted to coerce putative class members, the courts and plaintiff's
counsel have been able to remedy the problem with disciplinary sanctions.
Deliberate attempts to circumvent the supervisory role of the court are
already punishable by disciplinary codes and have a remedy available in a
motion by the plaintiff or on the court's own accord to hold defense counsel
in contempt of court.137 The system, as it stands under Gulf Oil Co., also
places the burden on parties to "defend their good faith, at the risk of a
contempt citation." 38
Arguments to strengthen restrictions on the speech of defense
counsel before class certification fail to acknowledge the increase in the
cost of litigation and the greater time commitments needed by the court to
comply with stronger restrictions.'3 9 Opponents argue that it seems
inconsistent for the Court to give the power to control communications after
an event because, "that power is worthless if the court is unaware of any
communication in the first place. It seems illogical to say that a court has
the power to confront and solve the problem of improper communication
but must wait until randomly becoming aware of a violation to do
anything." 40
Congressional inaction and increased restrictions will create a higher
workload for courts. Critics of Gulf Oil Co. point out that the standard
provided by the court is remedial and only cleans up the damage after the
improper communication has occurred.14' The Gulf Oil Co. court didn't
reach far enough to protect putative class members by, "requiring parties to
present an evidentiary showing of 'actual' or 'threatened' harm before
imposing restrictions on pre-certification communication with absent class
members." 42 Instead, the Court should have tempered its ruling by
considering jurisprudence surrounding commercial speech in general and
the law surrounding lawyer advertising and lawyer solicitation. The court
already enjoys the right to control litigation from the onset under Federal
36 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
13 7 Fed.Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D. at 377.
138 Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 103 n.17 (1981).
139 Id.
140 Craig M. Freeman, Knowledge is Power: A Practical Proposal to Protect
Putative Class Members from Improper Pre-Certification Communication, 2006
FED. CTS. L. REv. 2, 10 (2006).
141 Id.
142 See Gulf Oil Co., 452 U.S. at 89.
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Rule of Procedure 16.143 The defense counsel's adverse interests justify
strengthening the regulation of defense counsel communication. This
perspective omits the fact that putative class members who opt-out still
preserve the right to bring suit in another day at a more favorable forum if
necessary. The defendant does not have that choice--they must litigate each
case brought against them if the adverse party does not accept settlement.
Stronger regulation of communication will allow plaintiffs unfair
advantage and intrusive insight into the financial and business affairs of a
defendant who may have close economic or business relationships with
putative class members. In the context of the employer-employee
relationship, defendants cannot reasonably terminate employment
relationships or monitor every communication engaged in with an
employee without substantial costs to their bottom line. Plaintiffs' counsel
often argues that the employer-employee relationship is ripe for undue
influence, which would result in improper, opt-outs by putative class
members.'" Courts have rightly observed, however, that "employees are
free to consult legal counsel of their choosing to discuss the ramifications of
any waiver and that settlement between and employer and employees
should be encouraged." 145 Courts should recognize the value of settlement
by declining to practice 'premature judicial intervention' and by not
denying the right of the employees to consider settlement offers. 46
Remedies available to the court when damaging communication conducted
by the defense counsel are a strong medicine and can include nullification
of any opt-out certificates, sanctions, and even settlements that have already
occurred to be considered as an advance for a non-existent favorable
judgment for the plaintiff defendants must recover after a victory at trial.147
Defendant's actions in attempting to communicate with putative class
members can even be construed as interfering with the court's power.148
CAFA may move more cases from the state court system into the
federal courts, but it does not provide a remedy for the ambiguous standard
of certification problems created by the Supreme Court's Gulf Oil Co.
decision.14 9 Critics at the bills creation argued that the bill infringes upon
the delicate fabric of federalism - the balance of power between the state
and federal government - by tipping the scales of power away from the
states.150 Senator Graham, in his support of the bill, argued that CAFA
143 FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
4 Bulblitz v. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 196 F.R.D. 545, 547 (S.D. Iowa 2000).
I45 Id.
146 d
147 Id. at 378.
148 Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1203 (11th Cir. 1985).
149 See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 89 (1981).
1so 149 CONG. REc. S12994-02, 1 (2005).
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would actually restore the balance of state and federal power. 5 State courts
argued Graham was "trampling over the laws of other States in their zeal to
certify nationwide class actions and help enrich, frankly, the plaintiffs' trial
bar. The Class Action Fairness Act actually promotes federalism concerns
by helping ensure that magnet State court judges stop dictating national
policies from their local courthouse steps."' 52 The problem of the variety of
state rules is now substituted for the judicial discretion for communication
issues on a district-by-district basis. The only remedy available to defense
counsel is to file an appeal to the appellate court system to overturn abuses
of judicial discretion in its orders to manage communication. This presents
another hidden cost to defense counsel who only wish to engage in
communication to prepare for litigation.
One of the horror stories of the movement behind CAFA's passage
involves the Bank of Boston class action settlement - a class action suit for
the recovery of over-collected escrow fees charged to homeowners -
profiting from the interest collected.'5 3 The case was brought in Alabama
state court, which "awarded up to $8.76 each to individual class members,
while the class counsel got more than $8.5 million in fees. To make matters
worse, the fees were simply debited directly from individual class members'
escrow accounts leaving many of them worse off than they were before the
suit."l 54
The main problem with controlling costs of communication is not
the defense counsel but rather the unwieldy structure inherent in the class
action model, which requires a representative plaintiff to represent the class
but does not place enough monitoring to ensure that those interests are
adequately represented.' 55
151 Id
152 id.
13 S. REP. 109-14, at 14 (2005).
154 id.
'ss Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintifs'Attorney's Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations
for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 3 (1991). The problem the author points out that
is relevant to communication costs is the fact that plaintiffs' counsel are not under
enough regulation:
The existing regulations are extraordinarily ineffective at aligning
the interests of attorney and client; indeed, they often impair the
interests of the clients they are ostensibly designed to protect. Many
regulatory shortfalls can be traced ultimately to a single fundamental
error: the inappropriate attempt to treat entrepreneurial litigation as if
it were essentially the same as standard litigation, in which the client
exercises substantial influence. Even when the regulatory system
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IV. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DEFENSE COUNSEL COMMUNICATION
WITH PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS
Research conducted on the correlation between the increase in class
action litigation shows a startling trend - "the companies named as
defendants in class actions filed in 2008 accounted for over half of the total
market capitalization of the financial sector." 56 Many of the companies
facing class action litigation are also sustaining heavy losses from the
subprime mortgage crisis."'7 Cornerstone Research group's annual survey
of class action litigation in the securities sector explains that "most of the
lawsuits filed in 2008 were concentrated among the largest financial
institutions may indicate a rational strategy by plaintiff law firms to initially
focus on defendants with the deepest pockets."s 8 The plaintiff law firms
often place defense counsel in a position where they are forced to "pay
ransom to class attorneys rather than litigating frivolous lawsuits" in fear
that any further movement towards litigation at trial will result in an
unfavorable outcome for their client.'59 The class action procedural device
morphs from a procedural tool into a device that affects the merits of a
particular claim.16 0 Nonetheless, state court judges often are inclined to
certify cases for class action treatment not because they believe a class trial
would be more efficient than an individual trial, but because they believe
"class certification will simply induce the defendant to settle the case
without trial."' 6' One of the most prominent costs to defense counsel in
engaging in communication with putative class members. In the Matter of
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., a corporate defendant who engaged in the
business of manufacturing antihemophiliac factor concentrate (AHF) faced
a pending class certification of class members who were all Hemophiliacs
at risk for HIV as a result of using AHF.i1 6 2 The case had a large amount of
acknowledges that entrepreneurial litigation poses special problems,
it frequently attempts to resolve those problems by forcing class
action and derivative litigation back into a standard model.
Id.
'
5 CORNERSTONE RESEARCH GROUP, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS 2008: A
YEAR IN REvIEw, http://securities.cornerstone.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).157 id.
58 id.
19 S. REP. 109-14, at 20.
'6 Id. at 21.
161 Id.
162 Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir. 1995). Case
was appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and voted to grant the
petition for rehearing en banc. Judge Posner, in writing the decision to decertify
the class, argues that the district judge exceeded his power in his decision to certify
the class. The complications involved in the case would require bifurication of such
a nature that the Seventh Amendment rights of the defendant
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human sympathy - hundreds and thousands of hemophiliacs were infected
by the AIDS virus as a result of using products of drug companies that
create blood solids.1 ' The corporate defendants in this case were faced with
a huge obstacle - either fight certification and incur huge public relations
and business losses from bad press or settle with class members for a large
settlement. Judge Posner, in his opinion, wrote that :
Perhaps in the end, if class-action treatment is denied (it
has been denied in all the other hemophiliac HIV suits in
which class certification has been sought), they will be
compelled to pay damages in only 25 cases, involving a
potential liability of perhaps no more than $125 million
altogether. These are guesses, of course, but they are at
once conservative and usable for the limited purpose of
comparing the situation that will face the defendants if the
class certification stands." 16
Even the court, in its position as the arbitrator and supervisor of class action
litigation, acknowledged that the situation for the defendant in this case
would require defense counsel to spend funds pursuing twenty-five cases in
different jurisdictions that may or may not be favorable to the defendant.
Not one of those cases would bind the plaintiff class counsel and would
give plaintiff the opportunity to reassess litigation strategy in each case in
hopes to increase the amount of damages won for the class and attorney's
fees.
On Friday, January 29, 2010, Vivendi, a French media corporation
was found liable to shareholders for misstatements made by investors of the
Of particular relevance here, the judge must not divide issues
between separate trials in such a way that the same issue is
reexamined by different juries. The problem is not inherent in
bifurcation. It does not arise when the same jury is to try the
successive phases of the litigation. But most of the separate
"cases" that compose this class action will be tried, after the initial
trial in the Northern District of Illinois, in different courts,
scattered throughout the country. The right to a jury trial in federal
civil cases, conferred by the Seventh Amendment, is a right to
have justiciable issues determined by the first jury impaneled to
hear them (provided there are no errors warranting a new trial), and
not reexamined by another finder of fact.
Id.
163 id.
164 id.
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company.'6 1 Vivendi was slapped with a 9.3 billion dollar verdict that may
be the largest securities class-action jury verdict in history. ' The suit was
filed on the grounds that Viviendi had mislead investors on the financial
status of the company - causing the price of the stock to trade at a higher
price than what it was worth.167 This is the same argument that propelled
the class action shareholder lawsuits against financial securities firms after
the sub-prime mortgage crisis - that securities firms had mislead investors
on the risk entailed by investing in risky sub-prime loans. Experts studying
the spike in class action litigation have commented that the increase in
securities class actions correlated with the largest companies on the S&P
500.168 "If we examine the 85 companies in the S&P 500 that Bloomberg
classified as being in the financial sector at the beginning of 2005 (prior to
the start of the crisis), nearly one-third have been sued in sub-prime
liquidity crisis related securities class actions." 6 9
V. CONCLUSION
The birth of class action litigation as a procedural device to remedy
an aggregate of small claims is not diminished by the abuses inherent in its
inception. The purpose of the class action device was to address situations
"Where it [was] not economically feasible to obtain relief within the
traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for
damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless
they may employ the class-action device." 70 Abuse in the system began to
see anomalies such as the ability of a citizen to "bring a 'federal case' by
claiming $75,001 in damages for a simple slip-and-fall case against a party
from another state, while a class action involving 25 million people living
in all fifty states and alleging claims against a manufacturer that are
collectively worth $15 billion must usually be heard in state court (because
each individual class member's claim is for less than $75,000).""' Cases
that were truly of a national importance were kept out of federal courts
while cases involving primarily state law claims could be brought to federal
courts under diversity jurisdiction. The increase of class action filings has
raised the issue as to whether defense counsel should spend time and
resources on contacting potential class members to a higher importance.
165 Associated Press, Court Finds Vivendi Liable For Misleading Investors, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at B3.
165 In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 02 Civ. 5571, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
110283, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
166 Id
167 Vivendi Universal, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110283, at *23.
168 STANDFORD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 1, at 8-9.
169 id
170 Deposit Guar. Nat'Il Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
'71 S. REP. 109-14, at 11 (2005).
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Recent legal scholarship has noted that between the years of 1988 and 1989
the number of class actions filed in federal court have "increased by 338
percent and rose by 1042 percent in all state courts during the same
period." 7 2 Fortunately, the recent spike in class action securities filings is
considered a small bump in the road rather than an increasingly steep hill
for businesses to expect to continuously climb.'7 3 In fact, "if you rule out
specific events, such as stock-options backdating or subprime related cases,
the downward trend in class-action litigation might continue."l74
The sake of justice is a normative interpretative value that can be a bias
for or against either party involved in class action litigation. Defendants in
class action are typically typecast as power hungry corporations searching
for ways to increase profit at the cost of the well-being of other individual
actors in society. The plaintiff in a class action is often portrayed as a
guardian of public interest and a victim of unscrupulous corporate greed.
The court and the judicial system as a whole should decline to engage in
such dichotomies when considering whether or not to control the
communication of defense counsel. Class actions are unlike any other
method of resolution provided by Federal Rules or common law in the fact
that plaintiffs' counsel is so tenuously connected to the faceless thousands
and occasionally millions of plaintiffs that the lack of contact forces the
plaintiffs counsel to act more in its own perceived interests than the
interests of putative class members. The abuses are of such an extreme
nature that Congress, in its enactment of CAFA, stated that they
"undermine the National judicial system, the free flow of interstate
commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the
framers of the United States Constitution.""
The law on ex-parte communications with absent and putative class
members shows that communications are permissible as long as they are
not used to unduly influence class members or untruthful about the pending
class certification and subsequent litigation.'76 When courts consider
whether or not to limit the communication engaged in by defense counsel,
they should limit their inquiry to whether "the severity and likelihood of the
perceived harm if communications are not limited, the availability of less
172 Richmond, supra note 9, at 813.
'7 Judy Warner, The Litigation Storm, Bus. WEEK (Mar. 20, 2008).
174 id
's THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005,28 U.S.C. § 171 1(a)(4) (2006).
176 Ex-parte communication as defined by Black's Law Dictionary to connote
"communication between counsel and the court when opposing counsel is not
present." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 297 (8th ed. 1999).
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restrictive alternatives and the duration of proposed limitation."1"
Defendants should be able to communicate with putative class members to
adequately represent their clients when defendant determines that it is in its
best interests to oppose a class action. 178
Without leadership from Congress or the Supreme Court, the rights
of class action defendants are beginning to increase in constriction. The
First Amendment is violated when we do not allow a man to speak for fear
of their words being negative, subversive or contrary to majority beliefs.
This violation also occurs when judges engage in a preemptive strike
against defense counsel without a clear record of abusive communication.
There is already ambiguity as to whether absent class members in the pre-
certification are represented by counsel. Courts have now begun to move
towards increasing absent class member rights by holding that putative
members of class action suits have a right to representation when being
interviewed by opposing counsel. 179 By extending the Court's decision in
American Pipe Construction Co. v. Utah, the federal district judge
weakened the right of defense counsel to communicate with absent class
members who may or may not join the class.'so Unreasonable paternalism
won the day when the Court, in its ruling, stated that "If defense counsel or
counsel otherwise adverse to their interests is allowed to interview and take
statements from often unsophisticated putative class members without
approval of counsel who initiated the action, the benefits of class action
litigation could be seriously undermined."' 8 '
It is understandable that the court has to balance interests between
defendants involved in class action litigation and plaintiff's counsel. The
never-ending tug of war is often a reason why cases settle before they are
brought into court. Putative class member may turn into witnesses for trial-
therefore any waiver of rights made to speak to defense counsel must be
"intelligent and voluntary "without pressure from defense counsel who
could represent a former employer or a customer with a close business
relationship to the defendant.' 2 Settlement is an important tool to alleviate
the burden on the court system, but as observed by the United States
District Court of DC, "settlement cannot come, however, at the expense of
the class action mechanism itself to the detriment of putative class
members. The distribution of misleading information in order to exact early
settlement agreements from putative class members or the use of coercive
tactics is just the kind of wrongful conduct that undermines the class
1 Richmond, supra note 9, at 835.
178 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONs § 7.3 (4th ed. 2009).179 Dondore v. NGK Metals Corp., No. 00-1966, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6268, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
'o Id
1 1-5 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP. CLASS ACTIONS 22 (2001).
182 Dondore, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6268, at *6.
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action."183
Attempts by Congress to decrease the costs of class action litigation
through new legislation such as CAFA have only had a small impact into a
growing problem faced by securities firms involved in class action
litigation. There have been reports, however, that lawmakers wish to hold a
review on the impact of securities class-action lawsuits on U.S.
competitiveness.' Securities firms that were heavily involved in the
subprime mortgage crisis not only face the problem of when
communication with putative class members is permissible, they also work
under financial constraints caused by the very breach in fiduciary duty that
brought on the lawsuit in the first place.
183 Keystone Tobacco Co., Inc. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 238 F. Supp. 2d 151, 154
(D.D.C. 2002).
18 Judy Warner, The Litigation Storm, Bus. WEEK (Mar. 20, 2008) ("A letter
written to SEC Chairman Christopher Cox from Congressmen Vito Fossella (R-
NY) and Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.) asked Cox to hold such a roundtable, but no
date has been set").
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